Introduction
In the post-World War II era, the United States has engaged in a foreign policy action that has rarely been seen out of a colonial context: the peacetime stationing of its troops on the territory of sovereign states (Schmidt 2014) . This military presence has proven useful in expanding U.S. influence, but as a relatively new foreign policy tool, many of its implications remain untested. For the host states, the presence of another sovereign state's military within its borders may have large social, economic and political effects. In particular, this paper focuses on the effect of the United States' non-combat troop deployments on the human rights practices of the governments of their host states.
On one hand, there are good anecdotal reasons to suspect that the presence of US troops leads to better human rights practices by the host government. Since 1978, the US government has been required to consider the human rights practices of recipient states when making decisions about continued US security assistance (Forsythe 1987) . This requirement has only become more stringent with the 1997 addition of Section 620M, i.e. the "Leahy Amendment," to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Leahy 2014 US military personnel are increasingly informed of their human rights obligations in the field; for instance, the required CAPSTONE course for all new general and flag officers in the United States Military includes a human rights awareness component (CAPSTONE 2013 . home to the first regionally-aligned force for Africa. Its soldiers are expected to carry out a variety of missions in several African states, ranging from embassy protection to humanitarian exercises (Schmitt, 2012 ). An interview with the Brigade's Executive Officer revealed that training for African troops involves courses on how to deal with civilians and on the proper procedure to follow when they encounter human rights violations, as defined by UN standards.
The Americans incorporate human rights into all aspects for training. For example, when teaching students how to identify targets, human rights concerns are discussed. In some field exercises, they will have an entire village work as role players and then ask soldiers to interact with them in a manner that is in accordance with UN regulations. Under the academic portion of the training, human rights are taught by intentionally giving students scenarios that explore grey areas of international human rights standards, which allows the instructors to observe students' thought processes and update the sort of training that they give (Errington (US Army), 2014).
As an illustration of the potential positive effects of this kind of interaction between American and host country troops, the Brigade's Executive Officer recounted an anecdote from his time stationed in Guinea. He said that when the American forces first arrived, they noticed that the Guinean soldiers, when riding military convoys through civilian populated areas, would expect civilians to always yield to them and move out of their way. He noted that when they went through towns, the soldiers driving the vehicles would constantly honk their horns to signal to the civilians that they should move. The American officer interviewed noted that one noticeable and positive effect of the American presence and training in Guinea was that by the end of their deployment, the Guinean soldiers no longer behaved in this aggressive manner while driving through civilian areas (Errington (US Army), 2014) .
Though much of this evidence is solely anecdotal, there is clearly much potential for US troop deployments to positively affect respect for human rights in their host countries. On the other hand, there are also good theoretical reasons to suspect that U.S. troop influence and presence may actually reduce government respect for human rights in host states. Regardless of the efforts of the actual troops present or of human rights limitations on US military assistance, when it comes to the decision-makers in the United States, human rights have been, at most, a secondary concern in the distribution of that assistance (e.g. Apodaca and Stohl 1999) and US arms transfers (Blanton 2005) . The training programs at the School of the Americas and WHISC have long been the target for skepticism and criticism from human rights advocates (e.g. SOA Watch 2014), and there is some evidence that, among attendees of the School of the Americas, those that attended more classes are more likely to have been implicated in human rights abuses (McCoy 2005) . Indeed, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both the United States and many of its allies appear to have decreased their respect for at least some human rights (Goderis and Versteeg 2012).
In this manuscript, we argue that it may be possible to explain both perspectives via an overarching theory of US troop deployment and host state respect for human rights. Specifically, we focus on physical integrity rights, i.e. "the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government" (Cingranelli and Richards 1999: 407) . In the pages that follow, we argue that, when the host state is less salient to overarching US security interests, the presence of US troops can actually lead to better human rights practices. However, when the host state is more central to broad US military interests, these positive effects disappear. Overall, we find support for this argument using a dataset that covers troop deployments and government respect for physical integrity rights from 1982 to
2005.

The Consequences of U.S. Troop Deployments
What does the existing research tell us about the consequences of U.S. troop deployments for host state policies, and political and economic conditions? Previous work that has studied the deployment of troops as a foreign policy instrument has found that the deployment of U.S.
foreign troops can have a beneficial effect on the host country. In particular, it argues that the presence of U.S. troops may serve to improve the host state's economy. Despite the fact that troops are often deployed to unstable regions, the presence of U.S. troops provides a security umbrella that makes U.S. investors, who otherwise would be wary of committing resources to a dangerous region, feel like their investments are protected. Thus, there will be an increase in foreign direct investment to the host state, as well as trade with it (Biglaiser & DeRouen 2007 , 2009 ). These flows in trade and investment may then in turn lead to economic growth in the host state (Jones and Kane 2012) . Jones and Kane (2012) argue that U.S. troop presence leads to greater economic growth of the host in part through the diffusion of economic institutions by American troops. Specifically, they argue that "the presence of U.S. troops involves cross-cultural exposure, and that means that the U.S. standards of law, property, human rights, and respect for human dignity are inevitably on display (Jones and Kane 2012: 242) ." The assumption that follows is that the host nation will choose to internalize these norms, presumably with the intent of having them lead to greater economic growth.
Other work has found that the presence of U.S. troops may not always lead to beneficial consequences, or at least not consequences that are desired by the United States. For example, Martinez Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states that are hosts to US troops are more likely to reduce their own troop levels, while relying on US troops to provide security. Likewise, property-related crime may increase in some host states when U.S. troops are present (Allen & Flynn 2013) . In addition, states that are hosts to U.S. troops may be more likely to engage in bellicose behavior, initiating more militarized disputes (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013) and increasing their levels of defense spending (Allen, Flynn & VanDusky-Allen 2014) .
U.S. Troop Deployments and Human Rights
As the above discussion demonstrates, U.S. troop deployments are likely to yield both costs and benefits for host states. Likewise, we suspect that the relationship between troop deployments and human rights is more complicated than one in which U.S. troops always lead to improvements or declines in respect for such rights. As such, in the following discussion, we develop a theory that serves to reconcile the existing popular arguments, mentioned in the introduction, that relate U.S. troop deployments to improved or diminished respect for human rights. Overall, we argue that, when the presence of U.S. troops is of much greater importance to the host state than the U.S., deployments are likely to lead to improvements in the physical integrity rights practices of the host state. However, in situations when the host state is more central to overarching U.S. foreign policy objectives, this relationship may disappear or even reverse.
Why might we expect the non-combat presence of U.S. troops to lead to improved host state respect for physical integrity rights? First, when the United States deploys training missions abroad, it is often done with the explicit expectation that those missions will positively influence the host state's domestic security apparatus. As discussed above, when U.S. forces engage in the training of foreign troops, respect for human rights is taught alongside the traditional tactical and strategic training one might expect from a military training force (Errington (US Army), 2014) . Overall, such training missions attempt to alter the host state military's overall norms of behavior in such a way that they become more effective while simultaneously displaying better respect for the human rights of their civilian populations. As the US Army has expressed in its publications, when promoting a "hearts and minds" approach to counterinsurgency, respect for human rights may go hand in hand with military effectiveness (US Army 2009). Thus, we might expect the presence of U.S. troops to directly alter human rights norms in the host state such that the violation of human rights becomes a less acceptable tactic overall.
That said, such training does not accompany all non-combat deployments of U.S., and we do not necessarily expect host state agents to adopt better respect for physical integrity rights simply because such respect may be displayed by American troops. However, there are other reasons why governments may choose to restrict the repressive activities of their agents as a result of U.S. troop presence. In particular, we expect this to occur for two different reasons.
First, when the host state is not particularly salient to overarching U.S. interests, the host government may fear the removal of American troops and thus, the loss of any benefits (such as security provided by the U.S. troops, and the freeing up of resources that is accompanied by that security) associated with those troops' presence. Taken together, these two points imply that the presence of U.S. troops may alter the host state's incentive structure. Previous to the U.S. troop deployment, the host state may very well have utilized repression as a strategy for dealing with internal demands and threats. However, after deployment as part of a non-invasion force, U.S. troops serve to provide additional security for the host state (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013) . Assuming that the host state's preferences over security do not change, U.S. troop presence frees up resources that the state would have otherwise used for security (Morgan and Palmer 2000; Palmer and Morgan 2011; Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013) . Given that the U.S. is likely to pull its troops from states that are not central to U.S. security objectives if those states are producing publicity and other costs that the U.S. would prefer to avoid, the host state suddenly has a greater incentive to reduce its use of physical integrity rights abuse in an effort to remain a viable location for U.S. troop deployment. Thus, the host state has an incentive to alter its human rights behavior in order to preserve the added benefits provided by such a deployment. Overall, this leads us to posit:
Hypothesis 1: As the number of non-invasion U.S. troops increases in a state, respect for physical integrity rights by the host state government will increase.
Of course, not all troop deployments are created equally. If troops are likely to have a large effect on both the norms of the host state's agents, as well as on the strategic calculations made by host state leaders in their dealings with citizens, a significant and lasting U.S. troop presence may have to be established. First, if one argues that the positive effect of troop deployments is likely to come through norms absorbed through example and imitation, the U.S.
military presence would have to be large enough for much of the population to observe its functions. Likewise, if the host state's leadership is going to willingly curb its violations of human rights in order to please the U.S. and avoid international scrutiny, it must expect a long future of interactions with the United States and sizable benefits from continued U.S. troop presence. As such, if troop deployments are to yield positive effects on the human rights practices of host states, they are most likely to yield those effects when the troop deployment is large and/or reasonably permanent. As such, we argue:
If there is a large non-invasion U.S. military installation in a state, respect for physical integrity rights by the host state government will increase.
Relatedly, a longer-lasting U.S. military presence may be needed in order for U.S. troops to affect the domestic human rights practices of the host state. If norms are being transferred from the American troops to agents of the host government, we should expect that it will take time for those norms to become internalized. Further, the longer that a U.S. military presence persists, the more likely it is that the host state comes to rely on that presence in terms of the security and economic presence that such presence provides. Overall, this implies that the longer a U.S. military installation is present in the host state, the more likely that installation exerts a positive effect on the human rights record of the host state. This leads to our third hypothesis
Hypothesis 3:
The longer permanent U.S. military installations have been present in a state, the more likely that state's respect for physical integrity rights will increase.
However, as suggested throughout the above discussion, there is good reason to suspect that the mechanism discussed above varies across different levels of the host state's salience to U.S. security interests. 2 Previous studies on U.S. economic and military aid, have often found that, while the recipient state's human rights practices affect the distribution of U.S. foreign aid, those practices are of secondary concern compared to the importance of security and economic interests (e.g. Lebovic 1988; Poe 1992; Blanton 1994; Apodaca and Stohl 1999) . Likewise, Blanton (2005) demonstrates that human rights concerns had no effect on U.S. arms transfers during the Cold War. After the Cold War, the human rights practices of recipient states did directly affect a state's eligibility to receive arms from the U.S., but those practices were still not as important as security interests in determining the overall distribution of those arms. Taken together, these previous findings suggest that, while human rights concerns may very well affect U.S. foreign policy decision making, they are usually less important in those decisions than overall U.S. security interests.
Overall, we believe that the variation that exists in host states' importance for U.S. that has greater security salience, the high salience host state's costs of repression, even in light of U.S. pressure to desist, are likely to be much lower than host states of lower security salience. As a result, in locations that are more strategically important to the U.S., we expect the positive effect of U.S. troop presence to be muted.
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Hypothesis 4: As U.S. security salience rises, U.S. troop deployments' effect on host state respect for physical integrity rights decreases.
In fact, governments that are crucial to U.S. security interests may increase their level of human rights abuses after receiving a large deployment of U.S. troops. A growing number of studies have found that governments that rely heavily on non-tax revenues, such as those derived from foreign aid and natural resource wealth, tend to engage in higher levels of human rights abuse (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014; DeMerritt and Young 2013) . States that rely heavily on taxes for income need to encourage their citizens to engage in economically productive activity and maintain a less adversarial relationship with their citizenry. In general, a reliance on non-tax revenues serves to disconnect the government's needs from the economic prosperity and productivity of its citizens.
As such, states that rely heavily on non-tax revenues face fewer costs from engaging in human rights abuses. Similar to non-tax revenues, the security that U.S. troops provide is exogenous to the host state's relationship to its population, as the government does not have to rely on its citizens (or their tax dollars) to provide this security. If the state is quite important to U.S.
security interests, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be willing to remove its troops, even after high levels of human rights abuses by the host state, for all of the reasons laid out above. As such, a large deployment of U.S. troops to such a state may permanently alter the government's incentive to repress, reducing the cost of engaging in physical integrity rights abuses by reducing the state's reliance on their citizens. Thus, by this logic, we might expect that the leaders of states that are of high importance to U.S. security interests will display reduced respect for physical integrity rights in the aftermath of a U.S. troop deployment.
Hypothesis 5: At high levels of U.S. security salience, the presence of U.S. troops will be associated with decreased respect for physical integrity rights.
Research Design
In order to test the above hypotheses, we construct a country-year dataset containing information on changes in government respect for physical integrity rights, troop deployments, military salience, and a host of control variables from the years 1982 to 2005. These temporal constraints result from the start date of our measure of physical integrity rights and the last year of available data on U.S. troop deployments.
Government respect for physical integrity rights is measured using the Physical Integrity Rights Index from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014) .
This index provides a standards-based measure of the extent to which governments respect the rights of their citizens not to be tortured, politically imprisoned, disappeared, and extrajudicially killed. Respect for each of these rights is coded independently on a 0 to 2 scale and then summed to construct an index ranging from 0 to 8, with low values (0) indicating low respect for physical integrity rights (high repression) and high values (8) indicating cases with high respect for physical integrity rights (low repression) (Cingranelli and Richards 1999) . In using this measure, we focus on the change in physical integrity rights from time t-1 to t. Overall, our argument focuses particularly on the potential for troop deployments to alter existing human rights practices in the host state; as a result, change in government respect for physical integrity rights is the actual outcome of theoretical interest. Further, our focus on change helps to deal with the potential endogeneity problem between level of respect for physical integrity rights and troop deployments. It would be difficult to argue that changes in government respect for physical integrity rights that follow troop deployments are causing those same troop deployments that occurred in the past. Given the range in the dependent variable from -5 to 6, we treat it as continuous, and estimate an OLS regression model with robust standard errors clustered by country. 4 In addition, to further combat concerns about endogeneity, we lag all independent variables one year.
Our main independent variable is the number of US troops present in the host state in a given year. To measure this we use a dataset created by Tim Kane (2006 base, it is a large enough group to be able to make independent decisions. A battalion, the smallest unit in the United States armed forces that is tactically and administratively selfsufficient and is capable of independent operations, is defined by the United States Army as being composed of 500 to 600 soldiers (Army) . This dummy variable is intended to proxy a permanent base location, as Schmidt (2014) argues that a sovereign base is largely determined by a territorial dimension in which the host state cedes some amount of control of a piece of its territory to the deploying state. A battalion-sized unit is large enough to require such territorial control. This variable also helps to separate out the effect of these larger deployments from smaller deployments to protect embassies and other more routine activities.
To test hypothesis 3, i.e. that having a battalion sized deployment for longer durations should increase respect for human rights, we generate a count of the number of years that a state has 500 or more U.S. troops within its borders. This is similar to the approach taken by Moaz and Russett (1993) in their effort to measure democratic norms. The data on troop deployments goes back to 1950, so we begin the count with the start of the data collection. Even though our sample starts in 1982, a country could already have a count as high as 32 years in the first year of the sample. The variable is generated by simply counting the number of years that the 500 troop threshold is crossed. If there is year where that deployment no longer reaches that threshold, the count remains at the number from the previous year. As the purpose of this variable is to test norm-based arguments, it would be unreasonable to assume that after any duration of troop presence the norms would vanish with the departure of the troops. If the 500 troop threshold is crossed again after an absence, the count resumes.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 seek to test whether the security salience of a state conditions this potential positive effect of U.S. troop deployments on respect for physical integrity rights. This requires that we identify a variable that measures when a state is likely to be of a higher security salience to the U.S. 6 The challenge in identifying a single measure to proxy security salience is that U.S. security interests are likely to vary over time. We handle this by identifying two different major security issues that served as focal points of U. [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Our expectation is that in the Cold War model, places with no leftist rebellion will still see improvements in respect for human rights, while places with leftist rebellions will either be unaffected by troop deployments or will actually see a decline in respect for human rights. In the post-Cold War sample the effect of troop deployments should not be conditional on leftist rebellion; regardless of whether there is leftist rebellion, we should observe improvements in human rights following the presence of a large deployment.
The second way that we test hypotheses 4 and 5 is by examining whether the effect of U.S. troop deployments is conditioned by the occurrence of terrorist attacks within a state. We use terror attacks as a proxy for a state being more security salient to the U.S. Similar to leftist rebellions during the Cold War, we expect this conditioning effect to be even more pronounced after Sept. 11 th , 2001. Our hypotheses suggest, that post-9/11, large deployments of U.S. troops to places with a high number of terror attacks should have a null or negative effect on state respect for physical integrity rights, while in places with few terror attacks, U.S. deployments will continue to lead to improvements. In the years prior to 9/11 there should be little difference in the effect of troop deployments across levels of terror attacks.
We measure the number of terror attacks in each country in each year using the Global Terrorism Database (START 2013) . This is an event dataset that measures terror attacks that fit the definition of "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to obtain political, economic, religious, or social goals through fear, coercion, or intimidation (START Codebook 2014)." They measure both domestic and international terror attacks that a state experiences. We aggregate the terror events to the country-year, thus providing a count of terror events for each country-year. As a result of lost data, the events for 1993 are missing from the dataset provided on-line. Fortunately, the codebook provides the country-year counts of terror attacks for that year. Models were estimated with and without the observations from 1993
and the results remain substantively the same. To test hypotheses 4 and 5 we generate an interaction term between our troops measures and the GTD count of terror attacks. We then examine that interaction term in a pre-9/11 sample (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) and a post-9/11 sample (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . The expectation is that we should find a conditional effect after 9/11, while not finding one in the pre-9/11 sample. As existing research has illustrated, we also expect terror attacks to have their own independent negative effect on physical integrity rights (Piazza and Walsh 2009) Finally, we include a set of control variables that are conventional for estimating the level or changes in respect for human rights (Poe and Tate 1994) . We include the democracyautocracy index, ranging from -10 to 10 from the Polity data to measure regime type (Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers 2010) . We use the polity2 version of the measure, which imputes values that are missing (-66,-77,-88) . To control for violent conflict within the state and threats to the regime we include a measure of civil war. Using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditisch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2012), we start with the conflict-year dataset, identify all the intra-state wars with 25+ battle deaths, then generate a dummy variable to indicate whether or not a country year experienced a civil war. In our dataset this variable takes on a value of "1" if there is an ongoing civil war and "0" if there is not. As more populous countries have a greater opportunity for abuses and governments in more developed countries are less likely to violate human rights, we control for both the log of population and the log of GDP per capita. We use the expanded trade and GDP data to measure both population and GDP per capita. This allows us to avoid losing observations from missing data that results from using the World Development Indicators measures. Given the large positive skew of both variables, the natural log is taken of both. Finally, a lagged level of respect for physical integrity rights is included in each model estimated. This is included to account for the fact that, since our independent variable is equal to change in an ordered scale, countries near the top of the scale are less likely to experience increases than those near the bottom, by definition.
Likewise, those near the bottom of the scale are less likely to experience decreases than those near the top. As such, we expect the previous year's physical integrity rights index score to be negatively related to change in the current year.
Results
In this section, we discuss the results from the research design described above. In summary, the results initially illustrate a general pattern of the presence of U.S. non-invasion troop deployments leading to improvements in respect for physical integrity rights. However, the findings related to hypothesis 4 suggest that this optimism needs to be tempered somewhat, and that some of this effect is ameliorated by the extent to which a state has security salience to the U.S. We present the results of the tests of hypotheses 1-3 in Table 1 and the results of hypotheses 4 and 5 in Tables 2-4. *** Table 1 About Here***
The models estimated and presented in Table 1 allow us to assess whether there is a general relationship between U.S. troop deployments and changes in respect for physical integrity rights. Models 1 and 2 include the logged count of troops variable, with Model 1 presenting a pared down estimation with just the troops variable and a lagged level of the CIRI measure. In this pared down model, the logged troops coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that higher numbers of troops lead to increases in respect for physical integrity rights. In Model 2, the set of control variables for regime type, terror attacks, population, civil war, and per capita GDP are introduced. The coefficient for the logged troops variable remains positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. Models 3 and 4 substitute in our proxy for a more permanent base presence. In both the pared down model, and the model with control variables, the coefficient on the permanent base dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient in Model 4 is .22, indicating that the presence of 500 or more troops increases physical integrity rights by about a quarter of point on the eight point scale. Models 5 and 6 substitute the count of years that a state has 500 or more U.S. troops deployed in their borders. The coefficient on the count is positive in both models, although it is only statistically significant at the .1 level (however, this is on a two-tailed test). In sum, the results in Table 1 all point in the direction of U.S. deployments abroad increasing respect for physical integrity rights. However, the analysis in Table 2 will better inform just how general this pattern is.
Across all the models the results on the control variables are consistent with existing literature. Increases in terror attacks lead to decreases in respect for physical integrity rights.
More democratic states are less likely to engage in repression. States with larger populations become more repressive than states with smaller populations. Governments in states experiencing a civil war are more likely to violate their citizens' human rights and the higher a state's per capita GDP, the less repressive the government is. *** Tables 2 and 3 Here***
The results in Table 2 paint a slightly different picture. Models 1 and 2 look at the interaction terms between our troop troop presence variables and leftist rebellion in the entire sample. Model 3 looks at the interaction term between permanent presence and leftist regimes during the Cold War and Model 4 looks at the interaction after the Cold War. Across the models in Table 2 , the coefficients on troops and permanent bases are positive and statistically significant, except for in the Cold War sample. Across the models, the coefficient on the leftist rebellion variable is negative and statistically significant. Because of the interaction terms these coefficients are not directly interpretable. To interpret the interaction term, we calculate the conditional effect of the troops and permanent coefficients when there is a leftist rebellion and where there is not a leftist rebellion. Those coefficients and confidence intervals are presented in Table 3 . When evaluating the entire sample, it appears that increasing numbers of troops led to an increase in physical integrity rights when there is not a leftist rebellion. When there is a leftist rebellion in place, that effect is no longer statistically significant. This is consistent with hypothesis 4, but requires further investigation after splitting the sample between Cold War and post-Cold War years. The interaction between permanent basing and leftist rebellion in the full sample is not consistent with the finding from the log of troops measure. Regardless of whether there is a leftist rebellion the permanent coefficient is positive and statistically significant.
Turning to the Cold War sample, regardless of whether there is a leftist rebellion, the coefficient on permanent troop presence is not statistically significant. 7 The finding from this sample 7 The split sample results that include the interaction between leftist rebellion and logged troops are substantively the same.
suggests that, during the Cold War, troop deployments abroad did not lead to increases in government respect for physical integrity rights. In the post-Cold War sample, there are differences in the effect of permanent basing depending on whether there was a leftist rebellion.
In states with leftist rebellions, permanent basing has no effect on physical integrity rights. In states without a leftist rebellion, permanent basing increases physical integrity rights. Although this is outside the Cold War, this provides some support for hypothesis 4.
What does all this suggest? Although not entirely consistent with our expectations, it appears that in the full sample increases in U.S. deployments to a state only increase respect for physical integrity rights when there is not a leftist rebellion in place. However, the split sample results suggest that during the Cold War, U.S. deployments abroad uniformly had no effect on physical integrity rights, possibly because of the heightened security salience of all U.S.
deployments during the time period. After the Cold War, the U.S. deployments have a positive effect on physical integrity rights as long as there is not a leftist rebellion, but when there is a leftist rebellion, that relationship is no longer in place. Overall, this appears to demonstrate that security salience was uniformly high during the Cold War, thus making it so that troop deployments had no effect on physical integrity rights. Considering that relationship as a baseline, after the Cold War, when the security stakes are partly diminished, in places where there were no direct threats to U.S. interests (no leftist rebellion), troop deployments produced greater respect for human rights. However, leftist rebellions still provided an additional threat to U.S. interests, thus making it so that human rights would be less of a concern in these locations.
In other words, during the Cold War, the context of an individual state mattered very little; troop presence unconditionally had no effect on respect for human rights. After the Cold War security salience varied more widely, thus leading to U.S. troop deployments improving rights in some places and not in others.
*** Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 here***
The results in Table 4 provide another test of hypotheses 4 and 5. The coefficients and results on the constituent variables and control variables remain consistent with the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 . In this case, the moderating variable, GTD terror attack, is a count.
As a result, the interactive effects are best examined by plotting them out. Figure 1 plots the effect of a one unit shift in the log of troops across different counts of terror attacks. Figures 2 through 4 plot out the effect of a shift from no permanent base to having a permanent base across different counts of terror attacks. When the solid line is above zero and the dashed confidence intervals are both above zero, the effect of a U.S. deployments presence is positive and statistically significant. When either of the dashed confidence intervals cross zero, the relationship between U.S. deployments and physical integrity rights is null. Figure 1 , generated from the first model in the table, plots the conditional effect of the logged troop variable in the full sample. As can be seen in the figure, regardless of the level of terrorism, the effect of troops appears to be positive. In fact, the higher the count of terrorist events, the more positive the relationship between troops and changes in physical integrity rights appears to be. The same pattern is identified in Figure 2 , where the conditional effect of a permanent presence is plotted.
A shift from no permanent presence to a permanent presence has a positive effect on changes in physical integrity rights regardless of the level of terror attacks.
*** Figures 3 and 4 here*** However, we expect those effects to be different in the pre and post-9/11 years, where concerns about terrorism become paramount. Figure 3 plots the conditional relationship of permanent presence across levels of terror events for the pre-9/11 sample. 8 Pre-9/11, a permanent presence is only correlated with an increase in physical integrity rights when there is a higher level of terror attacks. The threshold seems to be at about 40 terror attacks. Post 9/11, the conditional effect of permanent presence, is consistent with hypothesis 4. At low levels of terror events, permanent basing leads to increases in physical integrity rights, and once the count of terror events surpasses approximately 15, this relationship goes away. This finding in the post-9/11 sample is consistent with idea that increased security salience diminishes the effect of permanent deployment presence.
Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the men and women of the U.S. military have been increasingly trained to take human rights concerns into account, both in their own field operations as well as in their work with other countries' militaries (Errington (US Army), 2014 (Apodaca and Stohl 1999) . Likewise, while the improvement of human rights has long been a stated goal of US foreign aid programs, researchers have struggled to find a systematic relationship between the receipt of aid and subsequent improvement in physical integrity rights (Regan 1995; Finkel et al. 2005 ). Overall, our results, combined with these above, largely suggest that the U.S. is capable of acting as a principled supporter of human rights norms internationally; however, when these norms come into conflict with strategic interests abroad, the U.S. government's effect on the importance of its fellow governments' respect for human rights appears to recede. This is an important finding for policy purposes. In the post-World War II era the U.S.
military has maintained a widespread presence across the globe. The consequences of these activities are important for both U.S. foreign policy makers considering deploying troops abroad and perhaps more so for the states that host these troops. For U.S. foreign policy makers and the U.S. military, if one of their goals is to promote human rights norms, it is important to know where these goals are not being met. For populations of states with U.S. troops deployed, it is important to know what the intended and unintended consequences of those deployments can be.
The good news is that in places with lower security salience, these populations can expect the added benefit of improved respect for human rights. Unfortunately, states with more proximate security concerns cannot expect that a U.S. military presence will have an impact on improving human rights.
Nevertheless, more study is needed on this topic. In particular, further research should examine how security and economic characteristics of a state's region condition the effect that U.S. troop deployments have on respect for human rights. For example, the presence of a U.S.
rival or another major power in the region may also affect the American willingness to retain troops in states that are human rights violators, or otherwise affect U.S. behavior. Future work can also look at more nuanced categorizations of U.S. troop deployments. Taking Interaction of Terrorism and Permanent Basing
